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1. Introduction and Background 
 
The basis of an operational complexity model (OCM) is presented. The model is based 
on the observation that an inverse relationship holds between the difficulty and/or 
intricacy involved in performing a task in a specified manner, as measured by its 
intrinsic complexity, and the likelihood that the task in question was in fact performed in 
the specified manner. 
 
Thus, in the context of a digital forensic examination, the operational complexity of 
formation of a set of digital evidential traces by a specified route should in principle be 
susceptible to ‘bottom-up’ ab initio determination. The resultant complexity should then 
be inversely related to the probability of formation by that route. 
 
There are many definitions of complexity. Lloyd [1] lists several complexity measures 
which in principle permit the complexity of formation of a set of digital evidential traces 
{Ei} to be defined. These metrics include computational complexity, information based 
complexity, logical depth, thermodynamic depth and crypticity. The data available in the 
problem space of digital forensic analysis appears to be most closely addressed by the 
computational complexity metric. In addition, it is desirable to include in the model a 
component relating to the human (or cognitive) complexity of the task. The GOMS 
(Goals, Operators, Methods, Selections) family of models offers a well-understood 
approach to the problem. In particular, the GOMS Keyboard-Level Model (KLM) [2] 
provides a tractable means of measuring the human involvement in the operational 
process. 
 
This development offers forensic examiners and expert witnesses the possibility of 
computing the probabilities that a given set of recovered digital evidential traces was 
formed via a number of alternative (mutually exclusive) routes. 
 
 
2. The Operational Complexity Model 
 
The resulting model may be formalized as follows. The various feasible routes by 
which the recovered set of digital evidential traces could have been formed are first 
enumerated. For each feasible route k by which the set of digital evidential traces {Ei} 
could have been formed the operational complexity of that route is given by: 
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Ck = KLMk + CCk 
 
where Ck comprises a cognitive complexity component specified by the GOMS-KLM 
and a suitably defined computational complexity (CC) component.  
 
The operational complexity of each feasible route Ck and its probability of occurrence pk 
are inversely related: 
 
pk ∝ Ck-1 
 
The constant of proportionality is determined uniquely by the normalization condition on 
the probabilities: 
 
∑ pk = 1 
 
The constant of proportionality α reflects the units in which the complexity of each of the 
feasible routes k is measured, and is given by: 
 
α = (∑Ck-1)-1 
 
It should be noted here that while the OCM model makes use of a complexity metric it is 
not based on Shannon information theory, which would lead to an inverse exponential 
relation: 
 
pk ∝ 2-Ck 
 
In the context of Bayesian network models, the posterior probability of a feasible route 
k to the formation of a recovered set of digital evidential traces {Ei} is given by Pr(Hk|{Ei}) 
where Hk represents the hypothesis that feasible route k was taken. The odds for two 
(mutually exclusive) alternative routes k and k’ to the formation of the recovered set of 
digital evidential traces {Ei} is then given by: 
 
O(k:k’) = Pr(Hk|{Ei}) / Pr(Hk’|{Ei}) 
 
In a digital forensics context, if Hk represents the prosecution’s contention regarding the 
formation of {Ei} and Hk’ is the defence’s alternative contention, then the odds O(k:k’) 
provides a valuable measure of the relative plausibility of the two competing narratives. 
 
 
3. Application to the BitTorrent Case 
 
To illustrate the use of the operational complexity model outlined above we give here an 
application to the BitTorrent case described previously [3]. The prosecution case is 
taken to be exactly as described in [3]. The defence’s alternative explanation for the 
presence of the recovered set of digital evidential traces {Ei} is assumed to be as 
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follows. A Trojan horse carrying the multimedia file as part of its payload installed itself 
on the defendant’s computer and invoked the µTorrent client to upload the multimedia 
file to a peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing website, before finally uninstalling itself. 
 
We have made a number of simplifying assumptions for the purposes of this illustration. 
The Trojan horse is not equipped with its own life-support system; the computer is not 
protected by a firewall or an anti-malware scanner. The basic unit of the KLM 
characterization [2] of cognitive information processing is taken to be the mouse button 
press or release; similarly, the basic unit of information processing used in 
characterizing the computational complexity is the byte. Disk accesses are assumed to 
take place autonomously and concurrently with CPU- and RAM-based processes. 
Given these assumptions and using documented or typical values for all other quantities 
(see the Appendix for full details) we obtain the following results: 
 
 
KLMk = 510 
 
KLMk’ = 0 
 
CCk = N + 20N/219 + 1,844,346 
 
CCk’ = (23/5)N + 20N/219 + 9,938,941 
 
 
 
Taking a typical value for the size of the multimedia file as N = 4GB, we obtain: 
 
 
CCk = 4,296,975,482 
 
CCk’ = 19,766,952,343 
 
 
Hence, providing that route k’ is the only feasible alternative to route k, we find O(k:k’) ≈ 
4.60, indicating that the prosecution’s case is 4.6 times more plausible than the 
defence’s case, given the recovered evidence. Alternatively, in the absence of any other 
feasible explanations, the probability that the prosecution’s case is correct is ≈ 82%. 
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4 Summary and Conclusions 
 
The recently developed operational complexity model enables the complexity of both 
the cognitive and the computational components of a process to be determined. From 
the complexity of formation of a set of traces via a specified route the probability of that 
route can be determined. By determining the complexities of alternative routes leading 
to the formation of the same set of traces, the odds indicating the relative plausibility of 
the alternative narratives can be found. An illustrative application to the previously 
discussed BitTorrent case has been presented, and the results obtained suggest that 
the proposed operational complexity model is capable of providing a realistic estimate of 
the odds for two competing hypotheses. This finding should prove useful for forensic 
examiners and expert witnesses as they seek to evaluate the strength of a case given 
the recovered digital evidence. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
KLM 
  Action M P B K H Total 
K (key press & release) 2 
  
       
   1 Drag and Drop 2 2 2 0 0 48 
P(point the mouse) 11  2 Double click 1 1 4 0 0 27 
   3 Single click 1 1 2 0 0 25 
B(button press/release) 1  4 Create torrent 5 6 10 0 0 136 
   5 Upload torrent 5 5 10 0 0 125 
H (hand to/from keyboard) 4  6 Type URL 2 1 4 16 2 79 
   7 Log in (username/pw) 4 2 4 16 4 122 
M (mental preparation) 12          
           
 
 
Variables Description BT specific values 
      
N no. of data bytes in file to be shared 4GB 
NTHC no. of data bytes of Trojan Horse Code 128KB 
NTHD no. of data bytes in Trojan Horse Dropper program (N+NTHC)/IFL 
NTC no. of data bytes in Torrent Client 7MB 
NTCI no. of data bytes in Torrent Client Installation file 276KB 
NDI no. of data bytes in Desktop.ini file 47B 
      
TD TimeDate read or write 8B 
TFN Torrent File Name  256B 
TFL Torrent File Length 4B 
TPL Torrent Piece Length 4B 
TPS Torrent PieceSize 512KB 
TAU Tracker Announce URL 35B 
      
IFL Inflation factor (unzip) 1.25 
      
DSK Disk access (assumed autonomous) 0 
      
PCI Peer Connection Information process 52B + 3TD + DSK 
TSL Tracker Server Login process 60B + 3TD + DSK 
PG Page creation process (webpage) 600KB + TD + DSK 
CO Cookie creation process 256B + TD + DSK 
CA Cache creation process 16B + TD + DSK 
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Route k (Criminal) 
Evidence (see [4]) KLM actions DSK Bytes 
E1 (incl. E2, 3, 5, 6) 1 3 N + 7TD 
        
E4 0 0 0 
        
E7 (incl. E8) 2+4 5 20N/TPS + TFN + TFL + TPL + TAU + 11TD 
        
E9 (incl. E10-12, 14, 15, 17, 18) 2+3+5+7 11 3PG + CO + 3CA + NDI + PCI + TSL + 17TD 
        
E13 & E16 0 0 0 
        
    
    
    
Route k’ (Trojan) 
Evidence (see [4]) KLM actions DSK Bytes 
DSI (Dropper S/W Install) 0 1  NTHD + 3TD 
        
DSU (Dropper S/W Uninstall) 0 1  NTHD + 3TD 
        
0 4 NTHD*IFL + N + 10TD TSI (Trojan S/W Install & payload 
copy incl. E1, 2, 3, 5, 6)       
        
E4  0 1 16 + NTCI  + NTC + 3TD 
        
E7 (incl. E8) 0 2 20N/TPS + TFN + TFL + TPL + TAU + 4TD 
        
E9 (incl. E10-12, 14, 15, 17, 18) 0 11 3PG + CO + 3CA + NDI + PCI + TSL + 17TD 
        
E13 & E16 0 0 0 
        
TSU (Trojan S/W Uninstall) 0 1 NTHD*IFL + 3TD 
 
